About one year after the formal start of Turkey’s accession talks with the EU, the two sides are in the midst of a crisis. In the worst-case scenario talks could be suspended by the end of the year. The proximate cause of this negative turn in the EU’s relations with Turkey is the failure of Turkey to open its ports and airports to Greek-Cypriot ships and planes from the Republic of Cyprus, despite having signed an Additional Protocol to its Customs Union agreement with the EU (the Ankara Agreement) to do just that in July 2005. Ankara’s position has been that Turkey will open its ports to Greek-Cypriot vessels if and when the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots is lifted, as promised by the EU in April 2004, and so northern Cypriot ports will also be opened. The EU insists there is no link between the two issues, and had hoped that Turkey opening its ports could for now get the Union round the bigger issue of full recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, which Turkey will not do in the absence of a comprehensive settlement on the subject of the divided island.
Elections and enlargementBut there are other problems of a more fundamental nature in EU-Turkey relations. On the Turkish side, there are growing doubts as to whether the EU is serious about the ultimate goal of Turkish membership of the bloc, combined with growing domestic political infighting as elections approach. On the EU side, there are concerns at the slowdown of reforms in Turkey, combined with the Union’s own loss of momentum over its stalled constitution which is feeding into doubts on enlargement in general, and Turkish membership in particular. For a number of rather obvious reasons, Turkey should expect to be scrutinized on many issues (including home affairs and justice) more than any other country wishing to join the EU has ever been, or will be, with the exception perhaps of Russia if we ever get to that point. As EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson mentioned in a recent speech, ‘…there are very important issues that we need to address: the size and large population of Turkey; the disparity of economic prosperity; the questions of cultural and religious identity.’ Indeed, these are important issues, which are perceived by sizeable audiences in Europe as potential problems and obstacles to Turkish membership. Furthermore, Europe’s willingness to assess Turkey’s candidature without prejudice and accept the country as a full member is under question. The same is true for Turkey’s willingness and capability to implement the necessary very extensive reforms. The fact that Turkey has practically entered a pre-electoral period with presidential and parliamentary elections due in 2007 further complicates the situation. The huge challenge of fully understanding the EU’s political philosophy and implementing the acquis communautaire has not been tackled in a very satisfactory manner by Turkey. For example, it is not clear in the minds of many Turkish policy makers that the Turkish model in civil-military relations is simply unacceptable to the European countries. The geostrategic puzzleTurkey’s geostrategic contribution to Europe is another topic of debate. As it has been rightly argued, the question of ‘whether Turkey’s EU membership will be a foreign policy asset for the EU will be dependant on a number of developments that will either precede Turkey’s entry into the EU or that are partly independent of the latter.’ By the time Turkey joins the bloc, EU and Turkish domestic politics and foreign policy, as well as various regions of interest, such as the Middle East, are bound to have changed in unpredictable ways. Indeed, in 15 years a very different Europe (in terms of membership, institutional mechanisms and external ‘orientation’) will be asked to decide whether to accept a very different Turkey. Discussions will be taking place on a regular basis in the next years ― as long as the negotiations will last ― in a mutual learning or, better, mutual understanding exercise, because although most European countries and Turkey have been allies and partners in NATO, Europe clearly is and will remain for some time to be in a transition phase. The Union is still trying to define its borders and identity, and is searching for a regional and global role in a new security environment. In this context, it is trying to strengthen its capabilities in the fields of foreign and security policy, is gradually ― and, many would argue, very slowly ― evolving into an international actor with a military logic, is trying to redefine the transatlantic relationship, stabilize its wider neighborhood and obviously cooperation between the EU and Turkey ― a candidate country unlike any previous ones ― is essential for a number of obvious reasons. The Ankara ProtocolWhat about the developing crisis? How the EU responds to a failure by Turkey to meet its Custom Union obligations and open its ports by the end of 2007 is essentially a political decision for the EU. While some countries, such as the UK, favor a weak penalty (suspending negotiations on three ‘chapters’ directly related to the Customs Union), others, such as France, appear to favor total suspension. The Finnish presidency will need to find a compromise agreement ― but if the EU 25 do not agree, any individual country can effectively block the negotiation process from now on, chapter by chapter. The author’s position is that it is in everybody’s interest to keep the negotiations alive, even at low speed, without, of course, sacrificing either the EU’s basic norms and values or any country’s vital interests. This would be beneficial for the EU as a whole, for Turkey’s immediate neighbors, Greece and Cyprus, as well as for Turkey itself. Even if the final outcome is not full membership but some form of special relationship, the reform process, for which the EU membership ‘carrot’ is serving as a catalyst, is of immense importance for the transformation and modernization of Turkey. By Thanos P. Dokos
Thanos P. Dokos is director-general of the Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens.
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