The EU-Turkey negotiating framework is strict and prescribes a laborious period of changes and reforms for the country. It is generally accepted that within 15-20 years, if Turkey achieves full membership or is granted a ‘special relationship’ with the EU, the Turkish state will not be the same. It will have to become a modern, democratic state.

However, before we reach that point, important questions need urgent answers: How is the current state of affairs in Turkey affecting its European prospects? Can Turkey win the bet to make all necessary reforms in order to join the EU? Can the EU afford a new enlargement and integrate Turkey as a full member?

It is obvious that a successful outcome depends on Turley’s ability to reform and adopt the acquis as well as the EU’s procedures and policies. It also depends on whether the Union will be able to overcome the crisis that it is currently facing and make all the much needed structural changes that will allow it to proceed with the enlargement project.

This analysis presents three basic scenarios with regard to the future of EU-Turkey relations in view of the upcoming assessment of Turkey’s European course. Will the accession negotiations advance smoothly or will the EU-Turkey train crash actually materialize?

The three scenarios

According to the current situation, three basic scenarios are considered:

Scenario 1: Turkey fully complies with the European demands and recommendations, and its accession negotiations continue uninterrupted.

This is the most optimistic scenario. Turkey manages to overcome all difficulties, accelerates its program of reforms and complies with the community’s requirements, which include the full implementation of the Customs Union agreement with all EU members, including the Republic of Cyprus.

Taking into account all recent facts, as well as Turkey’s domestic developments, this scenario is the least likely to be fulfilled. The reasons are:

• In order for the modernization program to proceed, there is a need for radical reforms, which will inevitably affect the vested interests of various decision-making centers in Turkey, such as the military and the Kemalist establishment. In a period of political instability and on the eve of Turkish elections (2007), the government and the political leadership are taking into serious account the domestic political cost.

• The increasing Euroskepticism in Turkey renders the promotion of reforms within a European framework more difficult.

• As far as the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Customs Union agreement with the Republic of Cyprus is concerned, which means the opening of airports and harbors to Cypriot airplanes and ships, Turkey will most probably not proceed to such an action, unless it ensures important diplomatic trade-offs such as direct trade between Turkish Cypriots with the EU and third countries.

Scenario 2: Turkey does not comply with the demands and obligations of the accession process, the negotiations are disrupted and Turkey decides to freeze its relations with the EU.

This is the worst-case scenario for all involved. Such a development will lead Turkey’s modernization program to stagnation and will increase the country’s Euroskeptic and nationalist sentiments. Additionally, it will most probably create a serious political crisis in Turkey, since the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan will face intense criticism from the opposition parties and the political and military establishment, as well as from the various factions within his own Justice and Development Party (AKP).

At the same time, such a development will have a negative impact on Greek national interests, since:

• Turkey will become an unpredictable neighbor again, which might try to externalize its domestic crisis to the disadvantage of Greek and Cypriot interests.

• Ankara will adopt a harder stance in relation to the Cyprus problem and Greek-Turkish relations. The fear of domestic political cost will not allow the Turkish government to take any goodwill steps regarding these issues. In this way, the impasse in Cyprus will continue, the de facto division of the island will be fortified and Greek-Turkish relations will once again enter a period of ‘high risk,’ during which the possibility of a serious crisis in the Aegean and Cyprus cannot be excluded.

Scenario 3: Adoption of a compromise formula.

Between those two scenarios there is a third version: a compromising approach that will avert a clash between Turkey and the EU. It is very difficult to specify what kind of a compromise formula will be reached. Certainly, neither the EU nor Turkey would like to see Scenario 2 materializing. The EU is aware that a crisis with Turkey would create conditions of instability in the wider region of the Eastern Mediterranean and would send the wrong message to the Balkan countries and the Muslim world.

In addition, the Union’s financial interests in Turkey will be undermined in case of negative developments in EU-Turkey relations. Turkey’s moderates are aware that a crisis would bring the country’s reform program to a standstill. It would increase the country’s current tendency to introversion and might result in political isolation, thus undermining every effort toward the democratization and liberalization of the state. At the same time, the fragile Turkish economy and Europe’s activities in the country would run serious risks.

It is thus only natural for both parties to seek a formula, so that the crisis may be avoided and Turkey may be able to continue its accession negotiations. Action is already being taken to find a way out of this emerging deadlock. Currently, the Finnish presidency of the EU, as well as the EU Commission and other interested parties, are working toward finding an acceptable compromise formula. It remains to be seen whether or not these efforts will lead to a positive result.

A period of high risk

The coming months will be crucial for the development of EU-Turkey relations. Both Ankara and the European Union are faced with serious challenges and must find ways of averting the danger of a new crisis breaking out with unexpected consequences. Greece (and Cyprus) has special reasons to worry about these developments and it is keen to avoid an EU-Turkey train crash.

As is apparent from events taking place both on the EU-Turkey front and inside Turkey, the unique moment in 2004 (when Turkey’s reformist bloc was firmly in command) for the solution of the Cyprus problem as well as the settlement of Greek-Turkish bilateral issues will not be replicated in the near future.

Hence, the next period will be one of high risk for Greek foreign policy, particularly as far as EU-Turkey relations are concerned. It is difficult to predict with certainty where these relations will lead to. Scenarios 2 and 3 are equally likely to actually happen. Naturally, Scenario 1 is the most favorable for all parties concerned. Nevertheless, the chances of this optimistic scenario taking place seem to be impossible. Hence, the possibility of a crisis cannot be excluded. The question, therefore, remains: Will the EU and Turkey find an acceptable formula to stop the train crash from happening?

Analysis from the ISTAME
ISTAME: Institute of Strategic and Development Studies ― ‘Andreas Papandreou’

This article is a short version of a policy analysis by the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (ISTAME) ― ‘Andreas Papandreou,’ titled ‘EU-Turkish Relations Facing a Crisis: Scenarios and Prospects’ and authored by Philippos Savvides, research associate of ISTAME.

The full document can be found on ISTAME’s website: www.istame.gr