Causes of populism

Political power has been systematically taken away from democratic majorities in many countries around the world. This process ultimately reduces the possibilities for profound ideological confrontation and leads to convergence of the political platforms of mainstream parties on centrist grounds. On the international front, globalization significantly diminishes the room for maneuvering of national political majorities both in terms of economic policies and foreign relations. On the domestic front, political majorities are subject to ever more intense competition from other centers of power: autonomous central banks, powerful constitutional courts, independent judiciaries and public servants. Overall, this specific combination of international and domestic factors has lead to the diminishing of the powers of politically elected bodies. Domestic political bodies generally make less of a difference in the contemporary world than they could previously.

However, citizens’ expectations about what their governments can do are not proportionally decreasing, as one might expect, but, on the contrary, they are on the rise. This is the second fundamental source of the populist condition. Societies ― from Africa to Eastern Europe ― have formed the belief that governance does matter, and that improvements in the patterns of governance can make a substantial difference in terms of overall social welfare.

The combined result of the two sources of populism is the construction of political majorities permanently dissatisfied with the performance of political elites. These majorities are fertile ground for the growth of populist movements.

Effects

Radicalization of politics: Political newcomers tend to adopt radical agendas, especially vis-a-vis the rule of law. They challenge not only specific policies of the mainstream parties, but the normative, juridical ‘shackles’ on political will and decision making altogether. Therefore, populist movements often campaign against external conditionalities and engagements of the state, as well as against domestic competitors of political majorities, such as independent agencies, constitutional courts and central banks.

Populists are for ‘substantive justice’ and are impatient for the observation of rights and procedural fairness. They are typically against the separation of powers and other liberal safeguards against oppressive majoritarianism.

The reaction of mainstream parties to the radicalization of the agenda of newcomers may in itself be contrary to the principles of the rule of law. There could be attempts to ban the newcomer parties or to exclude them by other means from the political process.

• Politicization of the judiciary:
  Mainstream parties have willingly passed an increasing number of difficult political decisions to the judiciary in sensitive areas such as privatization, restitution and the legacy of the communist past. Hidden behind the authority of international or constitutional rules, domestic elites are often willing to avoid taking responsibility for sensitive and unpopular decisions. The judiciary itself has been active in taking the opportunity to block unpopular policies of governments on the basis of legal rules and principles. These two symmetrical processes have led to intense politicization and expansion of judicial power.
• Self-entrenchment  of the established parties:
  An undesirable effect of populism on the rule of law is the tendency of mainstream parties to restrict competition by newcomers through constitutional and quasi-constitutional mechanisms. This leads to the politicization of the constitution itself, and to the blurring of the line between routine and constitutional questions. Ultimately, this leads to the undermining of constitutionalism ― the idea that there is a set of basic rules which are not questioned in the course of normal politics. 
  Cartelization of mainstream parties is a process familiar to students of contemporary democracy. The political insecurity for established elites, which populism causes, may intensify the tendencies among established parties to form cartels with the aim of blocking political competition. Helped by the judiciary, mainstream parties may actually turn the constitution into an instrument for the perpetuation of their staying in power.
  If the mainstream parties feel threatened both by newcomers and by the judiciary, or other independent centers of power, they might launch a campaign against these centers of power by trying to change the constitutional rules granting them independence and autonomy. In this case as well, the rule of law may be the ultimate victim, especially if the end result is political domination over areas which might be better left free from partisan influence (public media, judiciary, etc).
• Taking politics beyond the scope of the rule of law:
  The mainstream parties might themselves become a potential threat to the rule of law by: a) adopting some of the policies advocated by radical populists; and/or b) advocating the opening up of new areas of political decision making which are not subject to the rule of law.
  

Examples showing that mainstream parties do adopt policies advocated by populist and even extremist parties are not difficult to find. The whole issue of immigration, it seems, was first brought to the political arena by populist parties. Further, the calls for ‘law and order,’ tough measures against crime, and the fight against corruption are also such topics. All of them have the potential to be turned into threats to the rule of law, either by the introduction of rules violating individual rights and the separation of powers, or simply by the introduction of rules which have no effect, or are consistently disregarded.  

In addition, mainstream parties and radical populists alike may seek to open up and create political issues and spheres exempt from the constraints of the rule of law. Emergency circumstances, such as the war against terrorism for instance, help create an atmosphere in which this is possible. Anti-terrorism measures might be exempt from procedural fairness standards, or could be used to suspend the protection of certain rights, such as the right to privacy of communication, etc. In order to avoid judicial control and rule of law standards, governments are prepared to go to extraordinary lengths.

How serious is the danger?

This question has yet to be answered. It is possible to believe that the current rise of populism in Eastern Europe is just a temporary aberration on the road to normal ‘European’ party politics. An alternative explanation is that there is a process ― transcending Eastern Europe ― of profound political transformation. Traditional programmatic parties gradually give way to new, situational political players. In this new brave world of populist politics there is no need for coherent party platforms and stable loyalties: Political parties become by-products of media regulation and the rules of political financing. These by-products are easily dispensable, since the cost of setting up a new one becomes relatively lower.

If the second interpretation has chances of being valid, the phenomenon of rising populism, its causes, and its impact will attract more and more attention.

By Dr Daniel Smilov
Dr Daniel Smilov (DPhil, Oxon) is program director at the Center for Liberal Strategies, Sofia. He is also assistant professor of political theory at the Political Science Department of Sofia University and recurrent visiting professor at the Central European University, Budapest.

Center for Liberal Strategies website:
www.cls-sofia.org