In the Balkans, the second half of the 1990s marked the beginning of considerable changes in migration patterns in the region, following global migration transformations. An increase in the temporary and circular migration movements toward neighboring countries has been observed. (Circular migration here is defined as a repeated temporary migration ― migrants returning to their home country once or many times over a period of time.)
In contrast, permanent emigration to Western Europe and the transoceanic countries of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand has been declining. Temporary labor migration in the region chiefly involves Albanians migrating for work to Greece and Italy, Romanians to Greece and Israel, and Bulgarians to Germany and Greece. Spain and Italy are other destinations for temporary migrants from both Bulgaria and Romania. Greece, the only fully developed economy in Southeastern Europe, witnessed in the 1990s a remarkable migration turnaround from net emigration to net immigration, attracting increasing flows of mainly undocumented migrants from neighboring countries. Soon after, given the proximity to sending countries and Greek immigration legislation, it was no longer possible for immigration to Greece to be a one-time and discrete move from country A (Bulgaria, Romania or Albania) to country B (Greece). Similarly, return could not be expected to be a single move from host to home country. In other words, circular, repeat, multiple, seasonal or frequent migration became a silent feature of migration in the region. Circular migration has been commonly practiced since the 1990s by many Albanians and Bulgarians working in Greece, especially around the border regions. The benefitsIt has been generally recognized that temporary and circular migrations are an efficient development tool. They bring substantial benefits to home and host societies, allowing developed countries to deal with temporary job shortages, migrants to earn an income and acquire skills, and home countries to alleviate unemployment pressures on their labor markets, receive transfers, and welcome migrants with new skills and knowledge on their return. There is also a European interest in undertaking initiatives and applying programs that would foster circular migration for the benefit of development. The benefits of circular/temporary migration in a neighboring region are best demonstrated in the context of Mexican migration to the United States. From 1942, when the US Congress authorized a guest-worker program for Mexicans, the Bracero program, and up until the introduction of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, when Mexicans were practically if not always legally free to cross the border and work, the flow of labor was predominantly circular. Now, with much stricter border controls, the behavior of Mexican migrants has changed: While they are still coming, they are much less willing to return to Mexico in a circular or temporary fashion; instead, they bring their families to the US. A similar pattern has emerged with Bulgarians and Albanians in Greece. While in the 1990s, Albanian migration to Greece was clearly of a circular and temporary type, in spite of the frequent mass deportations by the Greek state, it turned into permanent settlement in the early 2000s mainly due to tighter and more aggressive border controls, together with the Greek state’s requirements for full-time social insurance contributions for legal residence, following the first government legalization program in 1998. The tighter the immigration controls to prevent foreigners’ employment, the greater the incentive to stay and settle in order to secure and maintain access to work. Restrictive migration policies can eventually turn out to be counterproductive. A similar problem appeared in major European countries, including Germany, when in 1973 the guest-worker regime was abolished abruptly in the face of rising unemployment. As a result, many guest workers stopped going home because they were unable to re-enter easily; rather, they chose to bring their families to Germany. An important question is: Is it feasible at all, and if so to what extent, to promote temporary and circular migration in the Balkan region? The main prerequisite for this is the legal security of migrants in both the sending and receiving countries. In fact, this seems to be a necessary condition for releasing the development potential of migration. The obstaclesRestrictive immigration policies tend to have diverse ‘perverse’ effects. In the context of migration and development, the most important perverse effect of such policies seems to be that severe restrictions on labor immigration tend to encourage the permanent settlement of migrants while interrupting patterns of temporary and circular migration. Hence, it is realistic to assume that this significantly lowers the potential contribution of migration to development, or at least to poverty alleviation, in the sending countries. It is also realistic to assume that temporary and circular migration is more beneficial to the development of countries of origin than is permanent settlement migration. Greek realitiesBulgarians and Romanians as circular migrants to Greece are in a different, even ‘privileged’ position compared to Albanians due to these two countries’ gradual incorporation into the EU and Schengen regime. Since April 2001, when they acquired the legal right for visa-free movement within the countries of the Schengen area, Bulgarians have also been crossing the border for employment on their three-month tourist visas. Romanians followed a year later, in 2002. In a few months, citizens of the two countries will face the prospect of becoming even more ‘privileged’ in the Greek labor market as their EU membership would allow them self-employment status. Greek migration policies are still exclusively dominated by measures to combat undocumented migration. Among them, regularization of undocumented migrants is prevailing. The country adopted its first legalization program in 1998, relatively late compared to other Mediterranean countries with similar migration experiences. As expected, the legalization program did not abolish illegal residence and work. In fact, illegal immigration kept rising after the program ended in May 1998. By the year 2000, the stock of illegal immigrants in Greece was estimated to be once again 400,000 persons. Even though it became clear that legalization can provide only temporary solutions to the ‘illegality’ issue and it actually tends to create positive incentives for increased illegal immigration, the country adopted three consecutive programs ― in 2001, 2003 and 2005. A policy shift is needed in Greece toward measures that facilitate temporary migratory movements as an integral part of regional development policies. Such measures can be designed on the basis of bilateral immigration agreements for seasonal work, contract, or project-related work. In June 1997, an agreement on seasonal employment of Albanians in Greece was signed between the two countries. One with Bulgaria was signed a year earlier. However, the agreement with Bulgaria never came into effect; there are no statistics available on the number of Albanians that might have benefited from the programs or whether all these people returned to Albania after their contracts ended. In its Communication on Migration and Development of September 6, 2005, the European Commission offers guidance on policies to maximize the development impact of temporary migration; one recommendation is to encourage circular migration by giving priority for further temporary employment to workers who have already worked under such schemes and returned at the end of their contract; another is to offer appropriate incentives to participating migrants. These incentives, for instance, could build on the experience of some member states in reimbursing pension contributions at the end of the worker’s contract, or might include a payment by the country of residence of a top-up on the worker’s savings. However, the only programs that Greece applies today for financial and technical assistance to neighboring countries in the field of migration and asylum refer to the enforcement of readmission agreements and the combating of human trafficking with Albania. Temporary and circular migration Nonetheless, policies that facilitate temporary migration, if effectively implemented and monitored, could be extremely useful in the Balkans, given the seasonal character of employment opportunities in the rural areas of the host countries, the project-specific nature of construction activities, and the contract-work character of home-based services and trading. They would preserve the beneficial effects of legal migrant status without creating incentives for permanent settlement. More importantly, these special agreements would preserve the necessary flexibility in foreigners’ working conditions by maintaining the cost advantages in contracts and by securing their employment. Policies to facilitate temporary and circular migration should also be supplemented by social and educational policies that would underpin integration and be consistent with migrant workers’ needs. Such policy measures include educational exchanges, training programs, and bilateral or multilateral agreements for the transfer of social security and of insurance and health benefits. Therefore, if temporary and circular migrations are considered to be beneficial for both the sending and the receiving country, they should be fostered rather than impeded. As was shown in the United States, tighter controls at the Mexican border have caused more undocumented migrants to stay. Earlier, the German experience also showed that difficulties with re-entering the country hampered return migration. These are clear examples of counterproductive policy measures. Hence, temporary and circular migrations require more serious attention by policy makers and researchers. Parts of the paper were delivered at the Greek Ministry of Interior Migration Conference on Capturing the Benefits of Migration in Southeast Europe, held in Athens on October 11/12, 2005. By Dr Eugenia Markova Dr Eugenia Markova is a Greek Ministry of Economics and Finance senior research fellow in the Political Economy of Greece and Southeastern Europe at the Hellenic Observatory of the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science.
Greek Ministry of Economics and Finance website: www.ypetho.gr
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