The spectacular victory of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the July 22, 2007 parliamentary elections contained a set of clear political messages. Turkish people rewarded the AKP for the economic growth and political stability which its government had secured. Besides, it clearly condemned military interventions into politics. The grave political crisis which erupted after the military’s e-memorandum of April 27, 2007 and the Constitutional Court’s decision of May 1, 2007 turned out to work to the electoral benefit of the AKP. The dramatic – and highly unusual for a single-government ruling party – increase of the AKP electoral strength should be primarily be attributed to popular reaction against the military intervention. Despite the high profile which the Turkish military has enjoyed in Turkish public opinion and the often-exaggerated concern of many secular Turks about the potential Islamization of Turkish society under the AKP, this was not translated into support or even tolerance for their blunt intervention. The uneventful election of Abdullah Gül to the Presidential office on August 27, 2007 comprised the culmination of AKP hegemony in Turkish politics and a turning point in republican Turkish politics. The third message was addressed to Turkey’s traditional political parties. Those parties whose electoral strength had plummeted in the 2004 elections again performed very poorly. The CHP failed to provide a credible political alternative to the AKP and was caught in a nationalistic, populist rhetoric which repelled many of its potential voters. The MHP recovered its position in the Parliament, capitalizing on the general rise of nationalism, though without approaching its 1999 percentage, while parties like the DYP and the ANAP got results which put their very existence into question. The public’s rejectionist stance pointed at the serious structural deficiencies of the Turkish political party system. Finally, Turkey’s Kurds sent a powerful message to the pro-Kurdish political movement in Turkey. By increasing their support for the AKP, they manifested that they shared AKP’s agenda for economic development, minority rights reform and Turkey’s EU membership and objected to political extremism.
However, Turkey’s post-election political climate has become seriously aggravated under the influence of developments in the field of foreign and security policy. The deep political crisis in Iraq has allowed for the resurgence of the PKK security threat and a serious deterioration of US-Turkey relations, as the deadliest PKK attacks for more than ten years hit Turkey. Moreover, the already strained US-Turkey relations faced the possibility of an all-time low, when the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress approved on October 10 a declaration on the recognition of the Armenian genocide and it seemed probable that the Congress itself would follow suit. Although the government has wisely avoided inflammatory rhetoric and disproportionate reactions, the threat of Turkey’s gradual shift towards isolationism and rampant anti-Western nationalism cannot be precluded. It is imperative that the United States act promptly to eliminate the PKK security threat emanating from Iraq. The European Union, whose role in triggering the reform since 1999 is hard to overstate, should also continue to offer a balanced set of reform incentives and a credible membership perspective. Turkey needs to maintain a moderate stance against the PKK provocation and accelerate reform in a broad range of issues – including minority rights – in view of its EU accession negotiations. The European Union should express its support for Turkey’s struggle against the PKK, clearly signal that the decision for Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership is final and that Turkey’s accession negotiations will be conducted on a fair basis. Western support is critical for controlling and resolving the current crisis.
The spectacular victory of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the July 22, 2007 parliamentary elections contained a set of clear political messages. Turkish people rewarded the AKP for the economic growth and political stability which its government had secured. Besides, it clearly condemned military interventions into politics. The grave political crisis which erupted after the military’s e-memorandum of April 27, 2007 and the Constitutional Court’s decision of May 1, 2007 turned out to work to the electoral benefit of the AKP. The dramatic – and highly unusual for a single-government ruling party – increase of the AKP electoral strength should be primarily be attributed to popular reaction against the military intervention. Despite the high profile which the Turkish military has enjoyed in Turkish public opinion and the often-exaggerated concern of many secular Turks about the potential Islamization of Turkish society under the AKP, this was not translated into support or even tolerance for their blunt intervention. The uneventful election of Abdullah Gül to the Presidential office on August 27, 2007 comprised the culmination of AKP hegemony in Turkish politics and a turning point in republican Turkish politics. The third message was addressed to Turkey’s traditional political parties. Those parties whose electoral strength had plummeted in the 2004 elections again performed very poorly. The CHP failed to provide a credible political alternative to the AKP and was caught in a nationalistic, populist rhetoric which repelled many of its potential voters. The MHP recovered its position in the Parliament, capitalizing on the general rise of nationalism, though without approaching its 1999 percentage, while parties like the DYP and the ANAP got results which put their very existence into question. The public’s rejectionist stance pointed at the serious structural deficiencies of the Turkish political party system. Finally, Turkey’s Kurds sent a powerful message to the pro-Kurdish political movement in Turkey. By increasing their support for the AKP, they manifested that they shared AKP’s agenda for economic development, minority rights reform and Turkey’s EU membership and objected to political extremism.