By Antoinette Primatarova

January 1, 2008 marked one year of Bulgaria's membership in the EU. Bulgarian politicians and journalists felt obliged to comment on it, international ones less so. Domestic governmental representatives did sound rather upbeat and reflected upon opportunities seized. They considered the release of the Bulgarian nurses in Libya as highest proof of European solidarity and the acceptance of the Cyrillic spelling of the Euro in the Lisbon Treaty as highest recognition for Bulgaria's rich history and culture. Furthermore, they claimed a constructive role in the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty and both a constructive and an active one in the discussions on the Western Balkans and the Black Sea region (but remained silent on the rather incomprehensible line of no objections, but no support either for Kossovo's independence). As regards the expected benefits from the EU Structural and Cohesion Funds, the government sounded reassuring that after having all operational programs approved in late 2007, money will start to flow in 2008.

Against the upbeat comments on one year EU membership, it was puzzling to witness in early January an intrinsic anti-European campaign supported by the government. The aim was fostering expectations that the small units of the Nuclear Power Plant Kozloduy, closed in compliance with commitments anchored in the Accession Treaty, could be reopened. The campaign started on the eve of President Putin's visit to Bulgaria and its Eurosceptic undertone made it sound like bad PR in favor of the energy agreements signed with Russia: on the construction of the Burgas - Alexandropoulos pipeline, of the Nuclear Power Plant Belene and of the South Stream gas pipeline. There was domestic debate on the compatibility, especially of the South Stream agreement, with the EU's emerging energy policy, but Brussels didn't voice any official concerns. The Kozloduy campaign, however, provoked a firm ‘no'.

Most of the representatives of the opposition remained positive about the EU in general, but criticized the government's EU policy because of opportunities missed. The balance of 2007 was interpreted as no gain after the pain of preparing for membership. The opposition also voiced scepticism with regard to the future absorption capacity of Bulgaria and fears that the distribution of EU funds might be spoilt by corruption.

In early February, the European Commission's interim monitoring report under the ‘cooperation and verification of progress' mechanism gave the media one more opportunity to reflect upon achievements and shortcomings after one year of membership, in particular with regard to the judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organized crime. Most of the Commission's reports have a wording that allows for both the glass-is-half-full and the glass-is-half-empty reading. The government went so far in underplaying the critical elements in the report that the opposition simply had to overplay through tabling a motion of no confidence on the issue of corruption (with no chance to bring down the government).

Ordinary peoples' perceptions didn't allow for a uniform interpretation of Bulgaria's membership in the EU either. Different opinion polls have somewhat diverging figures depending upon  whether they try to access peoples' attitudes towards the year 2007 only or whether they allow for including a mid to long term perspective.  According to an Alpha Research poll from December 2007, 78% of those interviewed regard Bulgaria's accession to the EU as positive. However, as regards personal benefits, only 5% claim to have experienced a positive impact of EU accession in 2007. That is not surprising, given the short time of membership and the 12. 6% inflation rate for 2007 that many rightly or wrongly relate to EU accession. Still, 24% expect a positive personal impact in 2-5 years and 48% in 5-10 ten years. Obviously, ordinary people are aware of that EU accession was not the end of a journey to paradise but that there is still a lot of work ahead.

The increasing awareness that work ahead is rather an issue for the Bulgarian government than for the European institutions is one of the reasons for the low turnout in the May 2007 elections for Bulgarian Members of the European Parliament. What is more, the outcome resembled very much a national protest vote. The big winner became a newly established party - GERB - that is capitalizing on transition fatigue and is pushing for early elections without stirring anti-European sentiments.

As regards alignment with EU policies, 2007 gave a clearer idea about the challenges ahead.  On the eve of accession, Bulgaria considered the possibility of joining the Eurozone as early as 2010. After failing to join the ERM II mechanism in 2007 and the cautious approach of the European Central Bank and the members of the Eurozone towards its enlargement, plans are now going well beyond 2010.  In the case of Schengen,  Bulgaria and Romania are jointly targeting 2011 for joining.

Last but not least, ‘infringement procedure' entered the vocabulary of journalists and the public debate.

Bulgaria's problems resemble many of the problems of the 8 post-communist countries that joined the EU in 2004. After accession they continued to experience high economic growth. Still, they were shaken by political crises stemming not from accession related problems but from different deficiencies of the transition process. Education and healthcare are topping the list of vulnerable sectors in Bulgaria. The monitoring report of the Commission is singling them out because of corruption, but corruption is only the symptom of their unreformedness. Education and healthcare, however, were never topping the EU's demand list, neither could Brussels provide one single model for reforming them.

After one year in the EU, membership remains to be perceived as a necessary precondition for Bulgaria's sustainable development and prosperity. But it becomes more and more evident that it is not a sufficient one. After accession, the big challenge seems to be the ability of Bulgarian politicians to elaborate reform policies beyond the EU blueprints and to gain public support for them in a climate of transition fatigue.