The central tenet of the new policy is co-decision and co-management. While the EMP was used to associate Mediterranean non-EU countries under the EU’ s organization umbrella, the UfM is an organization of peers. Furthermore, political representation in the UfM has been upgraded with respect to the EMP: There is a biennial meeting of the heads of state and government on top of annual conferences of the foreign ministers.
Co-decision and co-management is enshrined in a co-presidency with one president from the EU and the other from non-EU countries. Furthermore, there is a mixed secretariat, composed of 20 officials -- 10 from the EU and its members and 10 from non-EU partners. This secretariat has the main mission of conceiving of and implementing key, region-wide projects of mostly social and economic character. These projects are assumed to work as dynamic factors by providing integration and development in the region as well as fostering convergence between the northern and southern Mediterranean. The EMP failed to assure this convergence. In fact, gaps in basic social and economic indicators did not narrow at all since the beginning of the Barcelona process. The new UfM program based on key projects should precisely succeed in narrowing the gap.
All in all, the basic innovations the UfM is laying on with respect to the EMP are: (a), a set of strategic regional projects managed by a light-footed, small secretariat and intended to assure dynamism of the process (rather than the comprehensive and somehow sluggish agenda run by the EU Commission); (b), a genuine partnership of “equals” bound to make southern partners own the process (rather than a somehow subordinate association to EU Mediterranean policies); and (c), an enhanced political representation to make the process of Barcelona more visible and effective in tackling the longstanding problems and conflicts of the region. Will it work?
Focusing on few key projects is, in principle, the right thing to do. However, the projects should not have a strategic role when taken one by one. Their strategic role has to stem from being part of an overall development strategy. The six projects pointed out by the Paris Summit (De-pollution of the Mediterranean; Maritime and Land Highways; Civil Protection; Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan; Higher Education and Research, Euro-Mediterranean University; The Mediterranean Business Development Initiative) are only partly convincing in this respect, as they fail to fit with a unitary, recognizable strategy directed at closing the North-South gap across the Mediterranean. Maybe more room should be made, beside education -- as contemplated by the Paris priorities -- to scientific innovation, technology, and vocational training as well. The latter would contribute to alter “starting conditions” in the southern Mediterranean countries and give more chances to individuals and firms in a proper strategic perspective. Other projects contemplated by the summit’s shopping list seem to have to do with more conventional concerns and other strategies. Maybe the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers conference next November, in finalizing the UfM Work Program, will proceed to clarify its overall development strategy and set out a more conspicuous list of key projects.
As for political dialogue, it will certainly be less inconclusive than in the EMP and may, in contrast, bring about effective cooperation and joint action. The inherent opposition and the splits that have characterized the EMP will certainly come to a stop, as the agenda is not established by the EU presidency anymore. Topics as controversial as democracy, political reform, and human rights will hardly be included in the agenda under the UfM’s co-presidency. In general, the rule of co-ownership in the UfM will exclude a number of arguments of interest to EU countries from being considered or approved, or will push them to the very back of the stage.
This stems not only from European complacency towards the southern partners, in particular the Arabs. It stems from European trends as well. While the EMP was related to the EU and its normative foreign policy, the UfM reflects EU denationalization tendencies and the comeback of realism. Rapprochement among Euro-Med states is already evident in matters relating to securitization, as terrorism and immigration, where there are controversies and rifts, still even substantive cooperation. The UfM walks in this same direction. All this makes Euro-Med governments as of today much closer than in past years and may promise a cooperative UfM in tune with European policy shifts rather than against European values.
As for the UfM enhanced level of political representation and partners’ “equality,” these factors are not “per se” conducive to successful political cooperation. Success would depend on variables lying outside the UfM, like the EU ability to strengthen its foreign policy, US foreign policy, etc. However, the emerging convergence between EU and non-EU Euro-Med partners we have just pointed out may prove conducive to political dialogue and cooperation and may help members’ “equality” and their higher level of representation to work in making the UfM deliver.
Having said that, the adoption of co-decision as the UfM’s fundamental tenet must receive due appreciation. First of all, it may work as a learning process. Second, and most importantly, it will limit results. Still, once acquired, results would be credible and feasible, as they would be backed by co-ownership. The shift from EU tutorship to co-ownership is in any case a step forward.
So an array of doubts surrounds the UfM launch. However, the UfM need not be underestimated at all. If the key projects, or some of them, succeed, this success would strengthen UfM political leadership and give it the force and the courage to increase cooperation and undertake joint action. In this sense, the UfM leadership should be advised to adopt a kind of two-stage, “low politics-high politics” strategy, by concentrating on assuring the projects’ success in the first few years so as take advantage of this success subsequently, and become able to enhance the level of political cooperation. In any case, the wish is that weaknesses will be corrected and success attained.
Dr. Roberto Aliboni is Vice President at the Italian International Affairs Institute-IAI, Rome.
