It has always been the dream of right-wing parties in Turkey to achieve the success and be the inheritor of Turkish Statesman and Prime Minister (1950–1960) Adnan Menderes, who founded the first legal opposition party ― the Democratic Party (DP) ― in 1946 after the Republican People’s Party (CHP)’s single-party period and made the DP in the 1950 elections the first party with an absolute victory over the CHP while gaining 53.3 percent of the vote. On May 2, 1954, the DP increased its support, getting 57.6 percent of the vote. Since then no Turkish party had achieved an increase of their votes after entering the elections as the ruling party until July 22, 2007, when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) did just that.

According to the results of the July 22 elections, three parties exceeded the 10 percent threshold. The AKP, with 46.66 percent of the votes, guaranteed its being the single ruling party with 340 seats and increased its votes 12.38 percent compared to the 2002 elections, which made the AKP the ruling party of Turkey for 4.5 years. The CHP got  20.85 percent of the votes with a 1.46 percent increase, gaining 112 seats, although it wa a big disappointment when one considers the huge numbers that had recently participated in ‘Republic Protests’¹. The third party in the General Assembly became the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which doubled its votes compared to the last elections. Extremist nationalist parties got 14.29 percent of the votes while ensuring 71 seats in the parliament.

For the first time in Turkish political life, a significant number of independent candidates entered the parliament, securing 5.2 percent of the votes and 27 seats (the 10 percent threshold is valid only for parties, not for independent candidates).

Participation in the 2007 elections reached 80 percent in spite of taking place during the summer holiday season. The number of women MPs in parliament doubled compared to the last assembly, reaching 50, of whom 31 are in the AKP. One of these women MPs is an independent candidate from Istanbul. She is a member of the Democratic Society Party (DTP)² and still imprisoned, sentenced for being a member of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). She will get out of the jail though, due to the immunity of MPs, and join the parliament.

After the elections, there will be some changes in the makeup of the assembly. Twenty-three of the 27 independents are  former members of the DTP. They will have the chance to regroup in the parliament under the party’s name. On the other hand, the coalition of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) with the CHP for the elections resulted in the entrance of 13 DSP members into parliament from the CHP lists. They are also expected to resign from the CHP and come together under the DSP umbrella. With that change, the CHP will have 99 seats in the parliament.

AKP victory

The AKP increased its votes in almost every city. The most important was the increase on the Aegean side of the country, which is traditionally a stronghold of the CHP, as well as Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, which used to be pro-Kurdish DTP centers. In these regions the AKP either became the leading party or leveled with the other two parties. For instance, Izmir was symbolically seen as the last stronghold to be conquered by the AKP and the last bastion to be defended by the CHP. The results showed that the AKP doubled its votes even in Izmir and became a real threat to the CHP. Those votes mainly came from the poor neighborhoods of the city. On the other hand, the CHP secured the middle- and upper-class votes as it did all around Turkey. That is why, strangely, the traditional social democrat voters (the excluded groups of the system in the international conjecture) went over to the AKP and center-right votes (simply the bourgeoisie votes) went to the CHP.

This success of the AKP can roundly be seen as the result of 4.5 years of stability and economic growth in the country and the reactions to the April 27 ‘e-intervention’ of the military during the presidential election. During the election period, the AKP successfully used this discourse. With tremendous growth that almost doubled the Turkish economy it was not difficult for the AKP to play the ‘prosperity card.’ After all, as former US President Bill Clinton said, ‘It’s the economy stupid!’

The AKP is very close to getting the achievements of the ‘periphery’ in the sense of getting a place in the ‘core’ with the election of the AKP-supported president, symbolically the cornerstone of secularism. The majority of the parliament belongs to the AKP, but after a previous court decision, the ‘magic’ number 367 is needed. With the 340 seats of the AKP and 27 seats of independents, the majority of them pro-Kurdish DTP members, that number to provide the absolute majority is now within reach. Here, it seems that the DTP is going to be a key party in some crucial periods and decisions in the near future. The first one will be the presidential elections. In this regard the DTP started to give the signals of bargaining with the expected future ruling party, the AKP.

Furthermore, the AKP proved that it is not simply an Islamic party supported by growing middle-class Islamists but a central liberal party which has garnered the vote of one out of every two people in the country from different classes, ethnic origins, statues, ideologies and lifestyles. As Erdogan claimed on the night of July 22 after his party’s election victory, they absolutely ‘became a societal center.’ In his speech, he also used very conciliatory language and stated his commitment to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s doctrines and embraced the other segments of society rather than resorting to provocative talk after such an historical victory.

CHP

On the other hand, the loser of the election was definitely the CHP, although it did slightly increase its votes by around 1.5 percent. Deniz Baykal added a nationalist debate to the Kemalist status quo and etatism of the CHP and transferred some prominent names from right-wing parties before the elections. Apart from Ilhan Kesici, none of them could have been selected. The nationalist discourse of the CHP (voters mainly chose to vote for the ‘real addressers’ of nationalism, the MHP rather than the CHP ― this discourse of the CHP mainly brought the votes to the MHP) united with the ‘threat’ propaganda stating the danger against the Kemalist and secular regime and acting with the military put the party in a more conservative position as being far away from social democracy’s values. The CHP and ‘elites’ proved that they are far from seeing the current social dynamics in Turkey. Several factors have contributed to rising nationalistic sentiments in Turkey and the consequent rise of the MHP. Negative developments in Europe itself have exercised an unfavorable impact on Turkish politics. The fact that Turkish membership had emerged as a major issue of contestation in France and also in countries like Austria during the European Parliament elections of June 2004 created the image in the average Turkish mindset that EU membership was not a credible objective. A typical line of thinking was that although accession negotiations had been formally opened, a sufficient number of obstacles would be created on the way to make sure that Turkish membership aspirations would be diverted to an inferior track of ‘privileged partnership.’ It is important to emphasize that rising Euroskepticism is a phenomenon that tends to affect most countries engaged in the process of accession negotiations, as was also the case for the new Central and Eastern European members of the EU which encountered such a phenomenon during their transition process to full membership.

It is understood that the regime anxieties of Kemalist elites and institutions are not shared by the majority of the people. On the contrary, the AKP was seen as ‘unjustly treated’ by the regime defenders and it increased its votes, especially during the process of Abdullah Gul’s presidential candidacy.

The two biggest ‘threats’ Turkey faces are the separatist movements (mainly the Kurdish separatist movements) and the Islamic movement, according to the Kemalist ‘core’ and elites during modern Turkish history. That is why Kurdish and Islamic identities were suppressed and excluded from the public sphere for many years and forced to stay on the ‘periphery.’ Starting with Adnan Menderes, who was more pro-Western but tolerant toward the traditional way of life and Islam, and continuing with Turgut Ozal, Recep Tayyip Erdogan can be seen as the mobilizer of the periphery toward the center. The reaction of military and other Kemalist institutions to the elections remains to be seen.

In consolidated democracies, mainly two parties get the majority of the votes, one from ― traditionally speaking ― the center right, the other from the center left. Turkey found its center right but the other pillar is totally missing. The CHP is far away from the social democrat or center left with its status quo and elitist characteristic. Thus there is a strong need for a social democratic formation in Turkey.

What next?

In this colorful parliament, people now are afraid to experience the vicious battles of Secularist-Islamist, Kurdish separatism³-Turkish nationalism, respectively CHP-AKP, DTP-MHP.

Within this period the AKP will form the government and the parliament will proceed with the election of the president, which dragged the country into the ballots.

The big bet for the AKP and Turkey is finding the balance between the rising nationalism, the Kurdish problem and the continuation of Turkey’s economic growth, EU aspirations and democratic reforms. One thing is certain: Turkey will continue in the coming months to hit the headlines while struggling to find its identity.

Dimitris Maziotis is a research fellow at the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM).
Ali Osman Egilmez is an MA student in Southeast European studies, University of Athens, and an intern at the Hellenic Center for European Studies (EKEM).